We model transmission of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV) in Hong Kong with a complex small world network. Each node in the network is connected to its immediate neighbors and a random number of geographically isolated nodes. Transmission can only occur along these links. We find that this model exhibits dynamics very similar to those observed during the SARS outbreak in 2003. We derive an analytic expression for the rate of infection and confirm this expression with computational simulations. An immediate consequence of this quantity is that the severity of the SARS epidemic in Hong Kong in 2003 was due to ineffectual infection control in hospitals (i.e. nosocomial transmission). If all infectious individuals were isolated as rapidly as they were identified the severity of the outbreak would have been minimal.
Introduction
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) emerged in 2003 and infected over 8000 people globally [WHO 2003a [WHO , 2003b . While the humanitarian and economic impact of the epidemic was significant the disease propagation was characterized by a relatively small number of clusters of SARS cases and several super-spreader events (SSE). Elsewhere [Riley et al., 2003 ], a SSE is defined as a rare event resulting in more than the average number of secondary infections from a single infectious individual. Clustering and SSEs result in disease propagation dynamics that appear characteristically "bursty".
In this paper we show that, not surprisingly, such inhomogeneous dynamics are not modeled well with the standard deterministic disease models. Moreover, we find that stochastic generalizations of these models also fail to capture the dominant characteristics of the SARS outbreak. We propose a complex network model with small world (SW) properties that captures the main features of the observed dynamics and yet may be characterized by relatively few parameters.
We show that simulations of this model provide transmission dynamics similar to those observed in Hong Kong during the SARS outbreak. Moreover, both localized clustering and the frequency of SSEs are a direct consequence of the model structure. For parameter values close to those observed in Hong Kong during 2003, we observe an extremely wide variety of behaviors; moreover the actual observed data are found to be typical. However, we do note that the simulations only provide a reasonable model of transmission of SARS in Hong Kong if the possibility of transmission within the hospital setting is included. If hospitalization is assumed to be equivalent to isolation, the severity of the outbreak observed in the simulations is significantly less than the true data. We conclude that the severity of the 2003 SARS outbreak in Hong Kong was due to nosocomial transmission. 1 Moreover, any future occurrence of the same virus can be effectively tempered with strict hospital infection control policies.
Finally, we provide a variety of simulations of propagation under different situations. We find that rate of transmission and the rate of occurence of nodal clusters are dependent on the relative frequency of local and nonlocal infections. For selected parameter values, our simulations show behavior indistinguishable from that observed in the SARS case data for Hong Kong.
In Sec. 2, we describe the data which we analyze in this paper and introduce some experimental and clinical results which we use to obtain parameter values for our model. Section 3 describes an attempt to model this data with standard deterministic and stochastic models. In Sec. 4, we introduce our model and in Sec. 5, we present the main results of this work. Finally we conclude our study in Sec. 6.
The SARS Outbreak in
Hong Kong in 2003 Figure 1 [Riley et al., 2003] found that during the first 10 weeks of the epidemic, excluding SSEs, an average of 2.7 secondary infections were generated for each case. 3 In the same paper, Riley et al. [2003] described a stochastic compartmental model of transmission dynamics. However, the model described in that paper is somewhat overparameterized. Donnelly et al. [2003] described the initial explosive exponential growth of reported SARS cases quickly being tempered. Moreover, their study also found that the mean incubation period of the disease is 6.4 days (with a 95% confidence interval of 5.2-7.7). We use this value of 6.4 days to model the duration of the incubation period in the models we introduce below. Moreover, based on case studies, they also found that the average time between onset of clinical symptoms and hospitalization was between 3-5 days. We used these values as an initial model for the time prior to isolation.
Very recent studies [Lau et al., 2004; Wong et al., 2004] have analyzed individual SARS cases in Hong Kong to provide us with rough estimates of the transmissibility of the disease. Lau et al. [2004] studied transmission of SARS between household members in a household with at least one SARS case. They found that among 2139 household members of 881 index patients there was a total of 188 likely secondary infections. 4 Therefore the rate of infection is approximately 0.088. If we suppose that the originally infected household member remains in the household for 3-5 days, we may assume that the probability of obtaining SARS from cohabitation with an infected individual is approximately 0.02.
Finally, Wong et al. [2004] studied a single SSE in the Prince of Wales hospital in Hong Kong. In this case, a single infectious individual infected 10 of 27 medical students who came into direct contact with him. This (admittedly highly infectious individual) therefore provides us with an estimate of a transmission rate of 0.37. This transmission rate is significantly higher than one would expect for general person-to-person transmission. One would suppose that the relationship between patient and doctor is somewhat more intimate than normal "social" contact. We do not consider this value in our analysis.
Epidemic Transmission Models
Referring to the data in Fig. 1 , we initially attempt to model this with standard SEIR type epidemic dynamics [Murray, 1993] . Denote the number of individuals that are susceptible to infection by S, the number that have been exposed (that is, those that are infected but not yet infectious) by E, the number that are infectious by I and the number that have been removed (either recovered, isolated or deceased) by R. It is then easy to see that the spread of the disease can be given by the SEIR model equations
where N is the total population size and σ, η and γ are the various transition probabilities between the four categories. In the case of transmission of SARS-CoV, N E + I + R and so N ≈ S. The equations then reduce to
or, written as difference equations
3 Actually, the precise meaning of this finding is unclear as the authors define a SSE as more than the average number of secondary infections. 4 The authors acknowledge that there is a possibility that SARS was contracted from a separate, or possibly common source rather than the infected family member, but this is probably unlikely. Fig. 2 . Estimate of the total daily number of infectious individuals for HK. The solid line is the cumulative sum of the revised daily SARS case data minus the cumulative sum of the daily recoveries and fatalities. The dashed line is three exponential fits to this data as described in the text.
which can be easily solved. Solutions are either exponential growth or exponential decay. From the time series data for transmission of SARS-CoV in Fig. 1 , we can derive a value for I as follows. We approximate the number of infectious individuals as the cumulative sum of the (revised) number of SARS cases minus the cumulative sums of the number of deaths and recoveries. This time series is depicted in Fig. 2 . In making this approximation we assume that hospitalized individuals are still infectious (this assumption is unavoidable, we will see later that it is also reasonable), and that recovered individuals are no longer infectious.
From Fig. 2 , we can clearly see that the exponential decay phase of the data. However, there is no clear exponential growth. Or, to provide a good fit to this data one must require that the model parameters of Eq. (2) be significantly nonstationary. This is clearly undesirable. Instead, we must resort to stochastic models of the disease propagation. For a relatively small number of infections in a large population, it is only natural that this should be the case. The simplest stochastic model is obtained by modifying (3):
where e and r are independent random variables. Epidemiological motivation may provide alternative formulations for the noise terms r and e in Eq. (4). However, for the current discussion, this is not important. Let us consider the difference equation in Eq. (4) and suppose only that e and r are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables. This is precisely equivalent to supposing that the errors in the fit of an exponential growth and decay curve to the two phases of the data, shown in Fig. 2 , are i.i.d. We therefore test the residuals of such a fit against the null hypothesis of i.i.d. noise using the method of surrogate data [Takens, 1993] . Figure 3 depicts the result of this calculation. Using lag one autocorrelation (i.e. x t x t−1 ) as a test statistic, we fit an exponential (growth curve) to the first 36 days, a second exponential (growth curve) to the next 24 days and a third exponential (decay curve) to the remainder of the data. We can see that the data is not consistent with the hypothesis of Eq. (4). Therefore we can reject Eq. (4) as a suitable model of the transmission dynamics, regardless of the distribution of the noise processes e and r . In the next section, we propose a more sophisticated alternative model based on a small world network structure.
Small World Model of Epidemic Propagation
The SEIR model discussed in the previous section supposes that all individuals have an equally small probability of being infected. In this section, we propose an alternative model structure where infection can only occur along certain predefined paths.
Suppose that the population is arranged in a regular grid. Each node can infect its four immediate neighbors (horizontally and vertically) and a random number of remote nodes. From the literature reviewed in Sec. 2, we see that the probability of infecting near neighbors (supposed to be members of the same household) is likely to be distinct from the probability of infecting remote neighbors (supposed to be daily acquaintances). Moreover, it is clear that by adjusting the relative magnitude of these two probabilities, one can generate transmission dominated by "clusters" (i.e. localized transmission) or many SSEs. Let p 1 denote the probability of infecting each of the near neighbors of a node and let p 2 denote the probability of infecting the remote neighbors. Suppose that there are n 1 near neighbors and n 2 remote neighbors. Moreover, S to E based on the SW structure and the infection probabilities p 1,2 ; E to I with probability r 0 ; and, I to R with probability r 1 . The lower panel depicts the distinction between short range and long range network links. The lower panel shows the arrangement of nodes in a small network. The green infected node may infect its four immediate red neighbors with probability p 1 and three other red nodes with probability p 2 .
we consider the model with four distinct groups of individuals, S, E, I and R, corresponding, as before, to those that are susceptible, exposed, infected and removed. This situation is depicted in Fig. 4 . We allow n 2 to be random and fixed for each node, hence node i has n (i) 2 links. Moreover, to explicitly model the small world structure with a scale free network:
Hence, although the near neighbor links are bidirectional, the remote neighbor links are only one-way. 5 In Fig. 5 , we depict the induced small world network structure and the explicitly modeled scale-free structure of the network. Namely, the number of links between any two nodes in the model is small; and, the probability that a node has a given (large) number of links is exponential. From Fig.  5 , we see that 85% of nodes are connected by less than eight links (and "almost all" are connected by no more than eight links). In fact, we choose the number of neighborhood links so that the connectivity of the social network in Hong Kong would be roughly the same as the "six-degrees of separation" observed in North America [Milgram, 1967] . 6 Finally, the probability of transitioning from state E to state I on a given day is r 0 , and the probability of transitioning from I to R is r 1 .
In the simulations that follow we always take n 1 = 4 to indicate the immediate horizontal and vertical neighbors, N = 2700 so that N 2 ≈ 7.3×10 6 is approximately the population of Hong Kong. Variation of the parameter r 0 is largely immaterial and we therefore fix r 0 = 1/6.4. With a daily probability of transition from E to I of 1/6.4 the average incubation period is 6.4 days (as reported by Donnelly et al. [2003] ). 7 The remaining parameters of the model p 1 , µ, p 2 , r 1 we study in more detail in the next section.
Results
We fix µ = 2.4 as this seems to be roughly appropriate for the degree of social connectivity observed in human networks. As a first approximation, we also set p 1 = 0.02 as suggested by Lau et al. [2004] . We do not adopt p 2 = 0.37 as cited by Wong et al. [2004] as this case is probably some-what atypical. Moreover, this value leads to rapidly explosive growth of epidemic which is highly unlike the observed behavior. According to published reports [Donnelly et al., 2003] , the time before hospitalization is 3 and 5 days. If we assume that hospitalization is equivalent to isolation (and therefore transition from I to R), we can take r 1 = 1/4 = 0.25.
Denote byn 2 the expected value of n 2 . From the distribution in Eq. (5), for µ = 2.4, this is approximately 8. The parameters n 1 , p 1 ,n 2 , p 2 , and r 1 can be used to approximate the expected number of new infections E(−∆S) by E(−∆S) = (n 1 kp 2 +n 2 p 2 − r 1 )I (6) where k is the number of near neighbor links that support possible infections and, because the near neighbor infections are arranged in "clumps", 1/2 ≤ k ≤ 1. Moreover, for each infected node, the number 5 Furthermore, for computational convenience they are only assigned for nodes that become infected. 6 By coincidence, the Erdös numbers observed for contemporary mathematicians. 7 Admittedly, the 95% confidence interval is 1-18 days and is therefore significantly greater than that reported by [Donnelly et al., 2003 ]. However, we found that the model simulations were remarkably robust to changes in r 0 .
of new secondary infections per day is approximately (n 1 kp 2 +n 2 p 2 ) and the total will be
where n k = (n 1 kp 2 +n 2 p 2 ). From the available data [Riley et al., 2003] , the average number of secondary infections is 2.7, therefore, we take n 1 kp 2 +n 2 p 2 = 2.7r 1 , and hence p 2 ≈ 0.386r 1 − 0.08. For 3 < 1/r 1 < 5 this gives 0 < p 2 < 0.05. By studying the stability of the difference equation version of (4), we obtain the eigenvalues
where, as before, n k = n 1 kp 1 +n 2 p 2 is the average number of infections. We note that, as expected, the disease will be contained if n k < r 1 . Suppose that the (average of) 2.7 infections occurred prior to hospitalization after an average of 4 days, then n k = 2.7/4 = 0.675. Hence the rate of spread of infection is given by 1 − r 0 + r 1 2 + 1 4 (r 0 − r 1 ) 2 + 0.675r 0 . Figure 6 compares the average growth rate observed in the data (a 5 day moving average of the ratio of the total number of infections on two successive days) to that computed from these eigenvalues. From the first 40 days of data for Hong Kong, the mean rate of infection is 1.19 and the range is approximately 1.1 to 1.42. Rates of infection of 1.19 and 1.1 correspond to r 1 values of approximately 0.025 and 0.2 respectively. Hence, we conclude that this model indicates that infection did not cease with hospital admission after between 3 and 5 days. In the early stage of the epidemic, the rate of transmission of the virus indicates that patients remained infectious for much longer periods of time (possibly up to 20 days).
We will now examine the role of clustering in the spread of infection. Clearly the number of "clumps" that occur in the model will be proportional to the number of long range infections. As such, we expect the ratio of clusters to infections is approximately given byn 2 p 2 /(n 1 kp 1 +n 2 p 2 ). If n 2 p 2 ≈ 0 the infection is largely localized and the growth of infection is polynomial (see Fig. 5 ). If n 2 p 2 n 1 kp 1 the growth of infection will still eventually become exponential (Fig. 5 ) but initially the spread is largely local and polynomial. Finally, ifn 2 p 2 n 1 kp 1 the rate of growth is exponential and the spread of infection is equivalent to a stochastic version of the standard SEIR model. It is the intermediate dynamics forn 2 p 2 ≈ n 1 kp 1 that are of most interest to us. In Fig. 7 , we illustrate the typical spread of infection for each of these four scenarios. From Fig. 7 one observes that increasinĝ n 2 p 2 increases the number of clumps and also the rate of transmission of infected individuals. With p 1 = 0 we see only isolated infections with no spatial correlation, and, conversely, for smalln 2 p 2 we see a small number of large clumps. In all simulations we see that the rate of infection is approximately polynomial until several nonlocal infections occur. At this point, one sees an explosive (exponential) growth in infection. We now present simulations of our model with various parameter values and attempt to reproduce the observed dynamics. Following this, we will provide some Monte-Carlo simulations with the same parameter values and show that the range of observed behavior is extremely wide.
Clearly, the original data represents a nonstationary system. One can observe at least two distinct phases. In our linear modeling (Fig. 2) , we assumed three phases, hence for our small world network model we also assume three phases. The reason for restricting our interest to such a small number of (discrete) regimes is to avoid problems associated with over-determined systems. 8 Clearly, we could seek more realism by increasing the range of parameter values during the epidemic, but, this would only be appropriate for a completely deterministic model. Instead we take N = 2700, n 1 = 4 and µ = 2.4 as before. The parameters p 1,2 and r 0,1 are set as follows: Fig. 8 . The top panel is a probability density plot of the temporal evolution of 1000 simulations (red is high probability) compared to the data. The middle plot is a comparison of the total number of casualties for each of those simulations compared to the true data value (1735). Approximately 13.5% of all simulations exhibited a greater total casaulty count than the true data. The bottom plot is seven "representative" simulations (randomly chosen from among the 91 simulations with a total casualty of between 1000 and 2500). In each case, we see that the data is typical of the observed simulations. r 0 = 1 6.4 , and
The three changes of p 2 correspond to the initial phase when SARS spread freely, 9 an intermediate phase when p 2 = p 1 , and a final phase when p 2 ≈ 0. In this third and final stage, a combination of limited movement of the population and rudimentary hygiene measures combine to effectively limit transmission. Similarly, we include two changes in value for r 1 . During the initial phase, r 1 is close to zero, which corresponds to the rate of growth when the disease spreads without any control measures. During the second phase rudimentary control is in place and r 1 has been decreased somewhat (as observed in Fig. 6 ). However, it is only during the final phase r 1 ≈ 1/3, corresponding to removal of infected individuals approximately 3 days after becoming infectious (i.e. in this final phase, hospitalization is equivalent to isolation). Figure 8 presents the result of 1000 simulations.
Finally, we provide some quantitative evidence that the simulations and model behavior are similar. In Fig. 3 , we have showed that the ordinary SIR and SEIR type models exhibited dynamics unlike the observed data. In Fig. 8 we see that, according to the very gross measure of total infections, the small world model and simulations are similar. In Fig. 9 we compute the lag one autocorrelation x t x t−1 , and the logarithm of the lag one autocorrelation log ( x t x t−1 ), for the Fig. 9 . The top panel depicts the lag 1 autocorrelation for 1000 model simulations compared to the data. The lower plot is the logarithm of the lag 1 autocorrelation for 1000 model simulations and the original data. One can see that the observed data is quite typical of these simulations (11.8% of the simulations exhibits larger correlation than the data).
1000 model simulations and the data. In direct contrast to Fig. 3 , the model and simulations are indistinguishable.
Conclusion
Our SW model of disease propagation, when applied to the SAR-CoV propagation dynamics for Hong Kong in 2003, shows that the most serious risk of SARS is nosocomial transmission. By isolating infectious individuals as soon as infection is identified (typically in 3 to 5 days), the severity of the SARS outbreak in Hong Kong in 2003 would have been significantly lessened.
Moreover, from a theoretical viewpoint, we see that the crucial feature in capturing the dynamic behavior of the transmission dynamic time series is combining local and nonlocal transmission. We find that the SSEs, typically associated with highly infectious individuals can be modeled equally well with highly connected individuals. It has been widely reported that highly connected individuals are found in human society, and to our model may be a more appropriate way to control bursty propagation of diseases within communities.
